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Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure 
 
Jamal Nazrul Islam*, Haradhan Kumar Mohajan**, and Pahlaj Moolio*** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Mathematical Economics, Social Science and Political Science are inter-related. In this paper, an attempt has 
been made to describe aspects of these subjects by introducing examples, definitions, mathematical 
calculations and discussions. Game Theory is included in this paper to study mathematical models in 
economics and political science especially to study Nash equilibrium. Success and failure of democracy are 
interpreted as different equilibria of a dynamic political game with cost of changing leadership. Unitary 
democracy can be frustrated when voters do not replace corrupt leaders. Federal democracy cannot be 
consistently frustrated at both national and provincial levels. Arrow’s theorem indicates that the aggregate of 
individuals’ preferences will not satisfy transitivity, indifference to irrelevant alternatives and non-
dictatorship, simultaneously to enable one of the individuals becomes a dictator. In this paper both social 
welfare functions and social choice correspondence are considered in economical environments. 
 
JEL. Classification: 71; 72; 73; 80; 
 
Keywords: Preference Relation; Pure and Mixed Strategies; Nash Equilibrium; Social Choice; Unitary and 
Federal Democracy.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is about social welfare function, which is introduced by Arrow’s book (1951, 1963). It has 
provided striking answer to a book abstract problem of democracy. A social welfare function is a procedure 
for aggregating properties of individual preferences into social orderings. Arrow’s theorem shows that it is 
impossible for a social welfare function to satisfy five conditions namely: i) Completeness and Transitivity, 
ii) Universality, iii) Pareto Consistency, iv) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and v) Non-dictatorship 
simultaneously. Arrow’s theorem makes social choice theory more challenging and interesting, as it makes 
apparent the inadequacy of specific approach to construct reasonable social welfare functions from simpler 
aggregation rules which we call social choice functions, so that one can use the solution to a certain 
aggregation problem to solve more complex aggregation problems. We have tried to describe social problems 
in simple way. In the start a simple story on game theory (Fudenberg  and Tirole 1991) and then following 
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(Myerson 1996 and 2004) game theoretical model named ‘Battle of Sexes’ used to describe how the political 
institutions are formed and how these are developed to create efficient political leaders. The paper includes 
aspects of both federal and unitary democracy following Myerson (2006, 2009) where we have shown that 
both democracies have some difficulties but comparatively federal democracy is better. Although both 
democracies are not stainless, the citizens accept them. Peoples franchise for their most preferred person and 
they can oust or not re-elect a corrupt leader again. A brief description is given on the behavior between the 
two adversary countries following Myerson (2006, 2008 and 2009). To describe this we have proceeded with 
Prisoner dilemma game. Here we have showed that a powerful country say America (A) cannot attack a 
comparatively weaker country. If A attacks, it has to lose some reputation which is bad for A. The whole 
world will see A’s behavior carefully and final result will either lose its reputation or become popular 
depending on A’s bad or good behavior. 
 
Some definitions are included from Arrow (1963); Sen (1970); Islam (1997 and 2008); Islam, Mohajan and 
Moolio (2009: Spring). These will be helpful for those who are new in this field. A brief discussion on 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is given to understand the full concept of theorem following Reny (2000); 
Geanokoplos (2005); Islam, Mohajan and Moolio (2009: Spring). Arrow’s theorem plays an important role in 
society so that from this paper even a layoff can realize the importance of the theorem. Nash equilibrium is 
an essential part in Game Theory. We tried to give a simple description of Nash equilibrium following Nash 
(1951); Fudenberg and Tirole (1991); Myerson (1985, 1996, 2004, 2006 and 2009). 
 
Some other related studies are: Black (1948 and 1958); Arrow (1951 and 1963); Schelling (1960); Barbera 
(1980 and 2001); Barbera and Coelho (2009); Barbera, Berga and Moreno (2009); Barbera and Moreno 
(2008); Feldman (1974); Harsanyi (1973); Hardin (1989); Sen (1970); Myerson (1996, 2007 and 2009); 
Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1990); Reny (2000); Bossert and Weymark (2003); Geanokoplos 
(2005); Bretyon and Weymark (2006); Feldman and Serrano (2006, 2007 and 2008), Islam (1997 and 2008); 
Ehlers and Storcken (2007); Suzumura 2007; Storcken (2008); Islam, Mohajan and Moolio (2009); Miller 
(2009); Brams, Fishburn (1978) and Sato (2009) . 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section-2 we have included Social Choice and Political Relations with 
society in the light of Game Theory. Here we have introduced some examples and definitions and have been 
duly analyzed the portion in some detail. In section-3 we have included Unitary and Federal Democracy. 
Here we have shown the differences, advantages and disadvantages with some mathematical calculations. In 
section-4 we have included International Relations between two adversary countries. Here we have used 
game theory to explain to create a good relation among the all countries of the world and have tried to give a 
suggestion to create a peaceful society. In sections-5 and -6 we have described Arrow’s theorem in some 
detail. Arrow’s theorem plays an important role in Economics, Political Science and Sociology. We have 
tried to describe the theorem easier way so that everybody can understand its importance.  
 
2. SOCIAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL RELATION WITH SOCIETY IN THE LIGHT OF GAME 
THEORY 
 
We like to study fables and myths. Mathematical models in Social Science are like these types of fables or 
myths, which we read to understand the problems of the society and the precise ways to solve them by 
mathematical models. In this section we focus on game-theoretical models to describe Social Choice and 
Political Institutions. We begin with a simple story to describe Game Theory (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).  
 
Let us consider an island and in that island, there is a forest. In that forest there are only two kinds of animals, 
deer and hare. Suppose there are two hunters in that island. If both of them hunt a deer, they will share 
equally. If both hunt for hare they each will catch one hare. If one hunts for hare while the other for deer then 
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the former will catch and the later will catch nothing. Let the cost of a deer is $100 and that of a hare is $10. 
So, each of the hunters prefers half a deer to one hare.  
 
It is a simple example of a game theory. The hunters in the game are the players. A strategy for a player is a 
complete plan for hunting a deer or a hare which are the players’ choice. The payoff to their choice is preying 
what they want to maximize. Players may learn some information in the game. One of them is cooperation by 
both hunting deer is equilibrium. So that equilibrium (Nash 1951) is a prediction of both players’ actions 
such that each player’s action is the best for himself given that the other player is expected to do. If each 
player believes the other will hunt a hare, each is better off hunting himself which is a non-cooperative 
outcome is also Nash equilibrium.  
 
Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between 
intelligent rational decision makers (Myerson 1985). By rational we mean that each individual’s decision-
making behavior would be consistent with the maximization of subjective expected utility, if the other 
individuals’ decisions were specified. By intelligent we mean that each individual understands everything 
about the structure of the situation that we theorists understand, including the fact that all other individual 
understand, and including the fact that all other individuals are intelligent and rational decision makers. The 
game theorist’s assumption is that all the individuals are perfectly rational and intelligent. The game is 
described into two ways, namely: (i) the strategic form or normal form and (ii) extensive form. Here we only 
describe about strategic form as follows: A game in strategic form is a special case of the multistage 
(Myerson 1984) form in which there is only one stage and each player has only one possible information 
state. That is it has three elements; a set of players  nN  ..., ,2 ,1 , for each player i  there is the pure-
strategy space iS  and payoff function iu  that gives player i ’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility  sui  for 
each profile  nsss  ..., ,1  of strategies. For some given player i  we will use all players other than i  as 
player i ’s opponent by “ i ”. First we consider the finite games where ii SS   is finite. Strategic form s  
for finite two-player games are often depicted as payoff matrices as in figure-1, where players 1 and 2 have 
three pure strategies each: U, M, D (up, middle and down) and L, M, R (left, middle and right), respectively; 
i.e.,  DMUs  , ,1  ,  RMLs  , ,2  . The first entry in each box is player 1’s payoff for the 
corresponding strategy profile; the second is player 2’s. 
 
       L     M    R 
     U     5, 4      6, 2   8, 3 
    M     3, 2    10, 5   4, 8 
    D     4, 0    11, 8   3, 10 
 
Figure-1: Strategic Form Game. 
 
A mixed strategy i  is a probability distribution over pure strategies. The space of player i ’s mixed 
strategies is denoted by 
i
where  ii s  is the probability that i  assigns to is . The space of mixed-
strategy profiles is denoted by  
i
i , with element . The players are assumed to randomize 
independently in a game without communication, so that player i ’s expected payoff to profile   would be  
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      susu i
Ss
jj
n
ji
  
1    , 
when the players used the randomized strategies  n  ..., ,1 . A combination of randomized strategies  n  ..., ,1  is a Nash equilibrium if, for every player i  and every randomized strategy i  ,    niiiini uu   ..., , , , ..., , ..., , 1111   . That is, each player i  can not increase his expected 
payoff by using any other randomized strategy i   instead of i , when every other player j  is using j . A 
mixed strategy profile *  is a Nash equilibrium if, for all players i , 
 iiiiiiii Sssuu 




    
* ,* ,*  . 
Nash equilibrium is strict (Harsanyi 1973) if each player has a unique best response to his rivals’ strategies. 
That is, *s  is a strict equilibrium if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium and for all i  and all *ii ss  ,  
 .*,*,* 




 iiiiii ssussu  
 
By definition, a strict equilibrium is necessarily a pure strategy equilibrium. 
 
Here we observe that in figure-1 no matter how player 1 plays, R gives player 2 a strictly higher payoff than 
M does which is called strategy M is strictly dominated. Therefore a rational player 2 should not play M. 
Again, if player 1 knows that player 2 will not play M, then U is a better choice than M or D. If player 2 
knows that player 1 will not play M, then player 2 should play L. This process is called iterated strict 
dominance.  
 
Now we discuss varying the strategies of a single player i  while holding the strategies of his opponents 
fixed. Let ii Ss    denote a strategy selection for all players but i , and we can write 
    niiiii sssssss  ..., , , , ..., , , 111   . 
Similarly, for mixed strategies we can write 
    niiiii   ..., , , , ..., , , 111   . 
 
Definition: Pure strategy is  is strictly dominated for player i   if there exists 
i
i such that  
     iiiiiiii Ssssusu         ,,, . 
The strategy is  is weakly dominated if  
     iiiiiiii Ssssusu         , , , . 
A two-player zero-sum game is a game such that   02
1

i
i su  for all s ; where one player wins and the 
other loses. This type of game studied in game theory but most of the games used in social sciences are non-
zero-sum. 
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Now we describe a game named “The Battle of the Sexes”. The Battle of the Sexes is a two player 
coordination game is used in the game theory. Imagine a couple. The husband would most likely to go to the 
cricket game. The wife would most likely to go to the film show. Both would prefer to go to the same place 
rather than different ones. The payoff matrix labeled in figure-2 below is a The Battle of the Sexes where the 
wife chooses a row and the husband choose a column. This game has three Nash equilibria as described in 
the following figure-2.  
 
Now we introduce a simple game theoretic model that tells how political institutions may be founded. Let us 
consider a simple “Battle of Sexes” game shown in figure-2 (Myerson 1996, 2004). The two players in this 
game are called player A  and player B , must independently choose one of the two possible strategies: to 
grab or to defer. 
 
  Player B 
  grabs defers 
grabs 0, 0 8, 4 Player 
A defers 4, 8 0, 0 
 
Figure-2: A Simple Battle of Sexes Game. 
                                           
 
If both the players grab or defer then neither player gets anything; if exactly one player grabs then he gets 
payoff 8 while deferential player gets payoff 4. 
 
This simple game has three equilibria. There is equilibrium in which player A  grabs while player B  defers, 
giving payoffs (8, 4). There is another equilibrium in which player A  defers while player B  grabs, giving 
payoffs (4, 8). There is a third equilibrium in which both players independently apply the same randomize 
strategy. Let us consider the probability of player A  grabs is x , so the probability of deferring of them is  x1 . Hence, from the figure-2 we get,  
   xxxx  1.0.418.0
3
2 x .  
Therefore,  the probability of grabbing of each player is 
3
2
 and the probability of deferring is 
3
1
. 
In this randomized equilibrium the payoffs are as follows: 
The payoff of player
3
22
9
16
9
8
3
20
3
18
3
2
3
24
3
10
3
1 

 

 A , and the payoff of 
player
3
22
9
8
9
16
3
20
3
14
3
2
3
28
3
10
3
1 

 

 B . Hence in this randomize 
equilibrium, the expected payoff are 


3
22  ,
3
22  which is worse for both players than either of the non-
symmetric equilibria. 
 
Now consider the island mentioned above with a large population of individuals. Everyday they randomly 
matched into pairs and play the simple Battle of Sexes once. Each player’s objective is to maximize a long-
run discount average of his sequence of payoffs from these daily Battle of Sexes matches. Symmetric 
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randomized equilibrium mentioned above is a long-run equilibrium for every player. But some of the players 
will want to maximize their payoffs by breaking symmetry among the matched players. This will create an 
anarchic state. Instead of this they will share an understanding about who should grab and who should defer. 
At this stage they develop an understanding that each player will grab when grabbing is in favor of him and 
the other player do better by deferring (getting 4 better than 0) and thus they play the game without any 
disturbance, which is also a self enforcing equilibrium. Such an ownership creates a problem that some 
players fail to cover many matching situations where they have no clear concept of the game. Instead, they 
can create an easier method so that everybody can understand the grabbing rights. So, all the islanders again 
need to meet together in a public meeting and ratify new principles to resolve the problems. If they fail to 
establish a suitable law then they can call one of the individuals to act as a neutral arbitrator. For being 
neutral the arbitrator can toss a coin and may recommend that the player A  should grab and player B  
should leave if the coin is Heads and vice-versa if the coin is Tails. In this case, the lower payoff player B  
could apply to the arbitrator for second trial. Therefore for the players to be coordinated by a random device, 
they need some way to focus themselves on one randomization that can not be repeated or appealed which 
will be focal arbitration (Schelling 1960). 
 
In this situation the islanders need a leader to provide focal arbitration. The leader must be any eligible 
person from the islanders and can be elected by a public election. The islanders might obey his instruction as 
long as everyone else is expected to obey him. The leader will instruct them everyday who should grab and 
who should defer, which is of course a self enforcing equilibrium. The islanders have right to remove a 
leader in the next election when they observe that their leader is a corrupt person. 
 
Of course, the real world is very different from the simple island of this fable. But as in this island, 
coordinated games with multiple equilibria are pervasive in any real society. Thus, any successful society 
must develop leadership structures that can coordinate people’s expectations in situations of multiple 
equilibria. So the first point of this fable is the basic social need for leadership and political institutions can 
provide it to their people. The process of selecting a constitution can be viewed as an equilibrium selection 
problem. 
 
Suppose that the players’ payoff in our model can also be interpreted as resources that increase their long-
term reproductive fitness. Then an anarchic island where these resources are wasted in the symmetric 
equilibrium would sustain a much smaller population than another island, wherein the players have systems 
of authority to coordinate them as better equilibria. If players from highly populated islands can colonize 
under populated islands, taking with them their cultural system of focal-equilibrium selection, then an 
archipelago of such islands should eventually be inhabited only by people who have systems of authority to 
coordinate them in matches where there are multiple equilibria. Thus, in any cultural tradition that has 
survived into the modern world, we should expect to find generally-accepted systems of rights and authority 
that provide effective focal coordination in most of the important games with multiple equilibria that may 
arise in daily life. 
 
The second point of this fable is that the effectiveness of a political institution may simply be derived from a 
shared understanding that it is effective. The remark that our islanders might choose their leader by a general 
public election is meant to suggest that the rules of any higher-order social institution may itself be sustained 
as equilibrium in a broader and more fundamental game that has an enormous multiplicity of equilibria. 
Applied social theorists must understand that there are games within games in the real institution which itself 
can be the subject of game-theoretic analysis. Any political system may be understood as one of many 
possible equilibria of constitutional selection (Hardin 1989). To the extent that political leaders can develop 
general rules and guide lines for the creation of new social and economic institutions throughout the society, 
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the political process of selecting a constitution may be viewed as the equilibrium-selection problem to solve 
all other equilibrium-selection problems in the society. 
 
The third point of this fable is that norms of justice may be largely sustained by systems of lower-order 
interactions among small group of people. Although resources could be rationally expended in paying leaders 
or in contests for leadership, our model also admits equilibria where justice is provided at no cost in every 
dyadic interaction. Any deferring player will obtain payoff 4 when justice demand it, while grabbing player 
will obtain payoff 8. So the higher-class societies always want to grab and lower-class societies always 
compel to defer if laws in the society is deteriorated. Blatant thievery may indeed be the difficulty of 
grabbing that other people expect to be deferring for them with such a bully. So, the establishment of justice 
in our island is an essential issue and the political institutions must be impartial, lustful and selfishness to 
build up a standard society in this island. The impartial leader will educate every people to become rational 
and intelligent to develop a civilized society in the whole island. But in the real society leaders or political 
institutions are not so. Everyone including leader is selfish materialist; i.e., everybody in the society wants 
his own maximum social welfare.  
 
The forth point of this fable is the concept of a boundary of the state wherein even small infractions of a 
boundary typically evoke costly defensive responses. Schelling (1960) showed that this theory of focal 
equilibria may provide a basis for understanding the logic of such rigid boundaries. If a player fails to 
vigorously fight against even a small violation of a perceived boundary might lead others to believe that the 
player would also surrender much larger areas. 
 
Let us explain this with an example from Myerson (2004). Consider the two players in figure-2 who will 
match everyday many instances of our “Battle of Sexes” game, but each of these matches will be located at 
different places in the island. We may imagine that the payoffs in these matches are fruits that ripen each day 
on bushes scattered throughout the field. Suppose that the player A ’s home is in the east of the field, 
player B ’s home is in the west of the field, and there is an old fence that crosses the field from north to 
south. So the player A  only expected to grab in the east of the fence, and player B  is expected to grab the 
west of the fence. Now suppose that one bush has grown right through the fence, so there is confusion about 
which side it is on. Then both of the players will want to grab it simultaneously. If any player ever left the 
boundary without grabbing then the other player will grab it confidently always and he also will grab fruits of 
both sides of the fence successfully in all future matches. Hence saving boundary is an important issue and 
patriotic symbols for the islanders of both states. The islanders will sacrifice their best efforts to save the 
boundary of their own state otherwise they will not be able to save their state. 
 
3. UNITARY AND FEDERAL DEMOCRACY OF TWO STATES AND COMPARISON BETWEEN 
THEM 
 
Let us suppose the island is divided into two states, namely the east and the west (Myerson 2006). Let us 
consider further that at present an elected leader with unitary democracy rules the east state and an elected 
leader with federal democracy rules the west state. First we analyze the unitary democracy of the east state. 
The leader is elected by public for a fixed period and then run for re-election again in each period until 
rejected by the voters. In each period he may rule honorably or corruptly. Let r  denote the leader’s payoff 
each period if he rules honorably and cr   be the payoff if he rules corruptly. So that c  is the ruler’s 
additional benefit in each period if he rules corruptly instead of being honorable. A politician who is out of 
power gets no payoff. In each period, each voter gets welfare w  from the government if the leader is 
honorable and each voter gets 0  if the leader is corrupt. Let voter transition cost is x  when they elected a 
new leader to oust the previous leader. So that in the case of changing a leader each voter’s payoff is 
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 xw   if the new leader is honorable and  x0  if the new leader is corrupt. Each politician wants to 
maximize the expected total discount value of payoffs, where payoffs in future periods are discounted by 
some discount factor   per period. Voters also discount their future payoffs by the same factor   per 
period. Here the parameters are 0 , , , , xwcr  with 1 . In equilibrium of this game, we say that 
democracy succeeds when the voters expect that their leaders will always serves honorably, with probability 
1 and the voters in this case get maximum payoffs. So the voters always elect a leader, who is honorable and 
oust a leader, who is ever deviated to corruption. When the leader is expected to always serve honorably, the 
voters’ expected discounted value of future payoff is     1...1 2 ww , and the leader’s 
expected discounted value of future payoff is 1
r
. In this case for success of democracy to be an 
equilibrium, xw  1  and cr
r  1 . 
Hence the voters want to replace corrupt leaders, and leaders prefer a long honorable career over a short 
corrupt career. 
 
If the voters always re-elected a leader with probability 1, regardless of whether acting honorably or 
corruptly then of course the democracy will be frustrated and the equilibrium is maximum for the leader. 
Again democracy will fail if the voters expect that their leader will always act corruptly and they do not want 
to oust the leader, since they have to expend a transition cost x , if they oust the corrupt leader. So that the 
corrupt leader always takes positive benefit c , if the democracy is frustrated and fails it will be called bad 
equilibrium. In this situation let be a small probability 0p  that a politician may be intrinsically virtuous, 
and serve honorably. A politician who is not intrinsically virtuous may be called normal, so that any 
politician has probability  p1  of being normal. For a bad equilibrium we get, 
 
w
xp  1 ; i.e.,  1
pwx .  
Therefore, transition cost x  is greater than the expected gain 1
pw
 from better government in the unlikely 
p - probability event of getting a new leader who is virtuous. Hence possibility of democratic failure still 
exists if the probability of intrinsic virtue is small enough.  
 
The ultimate fate of such state will be that the democracy will be abolished and the current leader will rule 
forever. Then the voters would get payoffs w  forever if the current leader is virtuous and they get 0 forever 
if that leader is normal. 
 
Now we describe the federal democracy of the west state where each of N  provinces has an elected leader 
called a governor, and there is also an elected leader of the nation called the president (or prime minister). In 
federal democracy at the beginning of each period, voters in the nation first choose a president, and then 
voters in each province choose a governor of their province. Then elected leaders both national and 
provincial will serve honorably or corruptly. A virtuous leader of course serves honorably. As above a 
normal president gets payoff 1r  or 11 cr   each period, depending on whether honorable or corrupt. Voters 
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get a payoff 1w  from the national government when the president serves honorably, but they get 0 from 
corruption, and they pay transition cost 1x  whether they elected a new president. Similarly, a governor gets 
payoff 0r  or 00 cr   each period, depending on whether honorable or corrupt. Provided voters get a payoff 
0w from their provincial government when the governor serves honorably, but get 0 from corruption, they 
pay a transition cost 0x  whenever they change a new governor. As before each politician has probability p  
of being virtuous type, and otherwise normal. Voters and politicians discount their future payoffs by the 
discount factor   in each period. We assume that the provincial governors and vice-versa do not influence 
national election. In federal equilibrium, the democracy in either level succeeds if the elected leader always 
serves honorably, with probability 1. The democracy is frustrated if they (leaders) expect to be re-elected 
always with probability 1, even though they serve corruptly. The democracy fails if the voters expect that the 
leaders that they elect will always serve corruptly if they are normal. As before we can write for provincial 
democracy 
 
1
1
0
0 
w
xp   and  1
0
00
rcr , and similarly in national democracy 
 
11
1
1 
w
xp   and   1
1
11
rcr  . 
We assume that a politician would always prefer being president over being governor, so that 001 crr  .  
 
We observe that there are multiple equilibria in this case. First we consider an equilibrium where provincial 
democracy is frustrated and fails. In this case corrupt governors would not be re-elected, so that all the 
governors would serve honorably. The national voters always expect that they will re-elect a corrupt leader. 
 
Again we consider an equilibrium where provincial democracy is frustrated and fails but national democracy 
succeeds. In this case a corrupt president would not be re-elected so that any president would serve 
honorably. All the governors expect to be re-elected again, since they know that voters do not elect new 
leaders. If a governor serves honorably he has a little chance of winning for higher national offices, therefore, 
the governors always trend to be corrupted. In both equilibria there is an inconsistency between national and 
provincial politics.  
 
There is a third equilibrium where democracy always succeeds at both the provincial and national levels. In 
this equilibrium the governors and the president always serve honorably because they know that otherwise 
they would not be re-elected. In a real democratic state the democracy cannot consistently be frustrated at 
both levels in a federal system which is the feature of a true democratic state. 
 
From the above discussions we can compare the unitary and federal democracy as follows: In unitary 
democracy there is a notable chance of electing a corrupt leader, but in federal democracy it is not possible 
being so easily. If the citizens are rational and intelligent then there is a little chance of electing corrupt 
leaders. In both cases, the citizens will not re-elect the corrupt leaders. Hence we can suggest that the unitary 
democracy is comparatively fragile but the federal democracy is stronger and lives long. 
 
4. INTERNATIONAL RELATION BETWEEN TWO ADVERSARY COUNTRIES 
 
In a dangerously perturbed world we need to create peaceful atmosphere for the innocent common people. 
Expansions of nuclear weapons are threat to the innocent people. In 1945 two towns of Japan, Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, were destroyed by atom bombs killing millions of innocent citizens. Here we use Prisoners’ 
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Dilemma game to describe two rival countries behavior as shown in figure-3 (Schelling 1960; Myerson 
2007).  Two countries’ problems have to be solved by the successful deterrent strategy, which is basis on 
balance between resolve and restraint provided that both countries have sufficient knowledge about these. As 
before this game has two players, player A  and player B . For interpretation, let A  stands for America and 
B  for Iran. In this game, each player must simultaneously choose one of two possible actions: cooperation 
or aggression.  
 
  Player B 
  Cooperation Aggressive  
Cooperation 0, 0 - 10, 2* Player 
A Aggressive  2*, -10  -5*, - 5* 
 
Figure-3: Prisoners’ Dilemma Game. 
 
Here asterisks (*) indicate each player’s best payoff. The cell that has two asterisks is a Nash equilibrium of 
the game which is 

  *5 ,*5 ; i.e., both players must be aggressive is a unique Nash equilibrium of the 
game. Of course for both players’ cooperation would be better off but mutual cooperation is not equilibrium, 
as each player will always be tempted to aggression. Consider that player A  will move according to the 
motion of B . When player A  gets to move second after observing what B  does, player A  has four 
possible strategies which are listed in figure-4 (Myerson 2007).  
 
                                   A ’s strategy                            B  cooperative                B  aggressive 
A  is cooperative always A  cooperative A  cooperative 
A  does the same as  B  A  cooperative A  aggressive 
A  does the opposite of B  A aggressive A  cooperative 
A  is aggressive always A  aggressive A  aggressive 
 
Figure-4: The Four Strategies of A ’S Action When A  Can Observe B ’S Prior Action. 
 
From figures-3 and 4 we can form figure-5 as follows: 
         
      B  cooperative   B  aggressive 
A  is cooperative always          0  ,0         *2  ,10  
A  does the same as  B          *0  ,0      5  ,*5   
A  does the opposite of 
B        10  ,
*2         *2  ,10  
A  will always be 
aggressive.      10  ,
*2       *5  ,*5   
 
Figure-5: A Game Where Player A  Moves After Observing B ’S Action. 
 
In each row of figure-5, an asterisk in the second number indicates the best payoff of B . Observe that there is 
only one such asterisk where A  does the same as B . So the player A  has one deterrent strategy that 
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motivates B  to act cooperatively. But in this case A  would get highest payoff 2 when A  would act 
aggressively. So A  does not want to actually follow his deterrent strategy when B  cooperates and B  
should not believe that A  would use this deterrent strategy, unless A  can somehow constrain himself to 
follow this strategy. Without such restraint, this game still has only an equilibrium, where both players are 
aggressive and both get payoff 5 . For being B  cooperative A  must make a credible commitment and to 
be sure this there need some outside force such as UN to restrain player A  from acting aggressively when 
B  has cooperated. Note that player A  behaves as like in figure-5 always with a different player B  each 
time that is cooperative, but it is impossible if player B  is same always.  
 
Suppose that player A  has a reputation of always being cooperative. So if player A  ever lost that 
reputation, by acting aggressively against a cooperative player B , then the world will believe that A  will 
betray always. Let the value of reputation be R  then if A  is aggressive then we will subtract reputation 
value R . So that by the above scenario we can form the following figure-6, where as long as the reputation 
value R  is greater than 2, there is a good equilibrium in which B  is cooperative and A  does the same as 
B  (figure-6). As before in this game has a bad equilibrium where both are aggressive always both will get 
the bad payoff ‘ 5 ’.  
 
 B  cooperative B  aggressive 
A  is cooperative always          0  ,*0         *2  ,10  
A  does the same as  B          *0  ,*0      5  ,*5   
A  does the opposite of B        10  ,2  R        *2  ,10  
A  is aggressive always      10  ,2  R      *5  ,*5   
 
Figure-6: Player A  Loses Reputation R  If A  Is Aggressive. 
 
So remembering the bad equilibrium and lost of reputation both players will focus on the better equilibrium 
according to Schelling’s focal-point effect. The world wants this type of equilibrium since it tends to a focal 
point say peace. Hence we can say that if America is always cooperative with Iran, then Iran as well as other 
countries will be cooperative, and the innocent people will suffer no more. If America acts aggressively with 
Iran and other countries of the middle-east then the whole Arab countries may be unified. In that case 
America may  pay a greater value for this aggression. 
 
We have mentioned that game-theoretic analysis is based on an assumption that people are rational. Of 
course nobody is perfectly rational. But all the people have common knowledge that conflict gives no benefit 
but destruction. In the history we have seen that there are people in the world who irrationally drawn to 
violence and destruction. For example Psychopathic militarists like Hitler become a threat to our civilization 
only when ordinary rational people become motivated to support them as their leaders. Now we can say that 
American people are rational and can elect a president who will be cooperative to the leaders of the other 
countries. As America is the most powerful country at this moment, the citizens of America should act 
rationally otherwise they may lose the reputation forever.  
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5. ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 
 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1963) is very subtle but delicate. Arrow showed that the preferences 
of many individuals be aggregated into social preference but there is a flaw in this aggregation. Because a 
social welfare function cannot be derived by democratic vote to reflect the preferences of all the individuals 
in the society. Here we will try to give a very simple version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. 
 
Before going to discuss Arrow’s impossibility theorem we need to discuss some definitions which are easy 
but will help those who are new in this field (Arrow1963; Sen 1970; Islam 1997; Islam, Mohajan and Moolio 
2009: Spring).  
 
5.1 Preference Relations in Social Choice 
 
In this section we consider the set of all n -tuples of real numbers which is denoted by nR  is called n -
dimensional Euclidean space. A typical element or a vector in this space is denoted by   nxxxx  ..., , , 21  
where  nixi  ..., ,2 ,1  are real numbers. Suppose  nyyyy  ..., , , 21  be another vector then  
ii yxyx  , i   
yxyxyx  but   ; that is, ix  is different from iy  for at least one i ,  
ii yxyx  , i  . 
Suppose two bundles of commodities are represented by the vectors x  and y . The components represent 
amounts of a different commodity in some unit, such as kilogram. We assume that one prefers the bundle x  
to the bundle y  or he prefers y  to x , or he is indifferent to the choice between x  and y . We can write 
these possibilities, respectively, as follows: xPy , yPx , xIy .  
 
Sometimes we use the notation xRy  to mean that either x  is preferred to y  or x  is indifferent to y , so 
that y  is not preferred to x . If xPy  then it is not necessary that all the commodities of x  are greater than 
all the corresponding components of y . We can write that it is not necessary that yx   or even yx  . If 
x  is not greater than y  we write xRy~ . 
 
Let  zyxS  , ,  be a set consists of three bundles of commodities. The following are important elements 
in our discussion. 
i) Reflexivity: xRxSx ;  . 
ii) Completeness: .or  & , yRxxRyyxSyx   
iii) Transitivity: . &  if , , , xRzyRzxRySzyx   
iv) Anti-symmetry: . &  if , , yxyRxxRySyx   
v) Asymmetry:  .~   such that  , , yRxxRySyx   
vi) Symmetry:  .   ; , yRxxRySyx   
We also use the following notations: 
For all ; , , Szyx   
i) If xPy  then xRy  & ~ yRx . 
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ii) If xIy  then xRy  & yRx . 
iii) If xPy , yRz  then xPz . 
iv) If xIy , yIz  then xIz .  
 
5.2 Utility Function  
 
We now define the utility function as    nxxxuxu  ..., , , 21 . In preference relation we can write      yuxu   xPy .  
Let us consider a fixed vector 0x , and consider the set of all the vectors x  which are preferred to 0x . If we 
denote this set by  0xV , we can write 
    00 : xPxxxV  .  
For the utility function it can be written as,  
       00 : xuxuxxV    
where  0xV  is a convex set. 
 
5.3 Maximal Set and Choice Set 
 
An element Sx  is a maximal element of S  with respect to R  if  yPxSy ~ ,  . 
The set of maximal elements in S  is called its maximal set, and is denoted by  RSM  , . 
An element Sx  is a best element of S  with respect to R  if 
 xRySy  . 
 
The set of best elements in S  is called its choice set, and is denoted by  RSC  , . 
A best element is also a maximal element but not vice-versa. Since if xRy , Sy  then yPx~ . 
On the other hand, if neither xRy  nor yRx  then x  and y  are both maximal elements of the set  yx  , , 
but neither is a best element. Hence we can write, 
    RSMRSC  , ,  . 
 
5.4 The Pareto Criterion 
 
Let us consider,  ... , , , zyxX   be a set of alternatives. Then for any two alternatives x  and y  if 
everyone in the society satisfy xIy  then the society should satisfy xIy  and we shall say that the society has 
Pareto-wise indifferent between x  and y . If at least one individual satisfies xPy  and the other satisfy 
xRy  then the society should satisfy xPy  and we say that x  is Pareto-wise better than y . An alternative x  
belong to the set X  will be described as Pareto-optimal if there is no other alternative in the set which 
Pareto-wise better than x . Most of the modern welfare economies are based on Pareto optimality. The 
optimality of a system is judged in terms of whether it achieves Pareto-optimality or not. But we cannot 
proceed too more. Suppose one individual prefers x  to y  and another prefers y  to x , and the rest of the 
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individuals are x  vis-à-vis y  and no matter how many of the individuals are there. In this case we cannot 
compare the society using the Pareto rule. Sometimes an economy or society can be Pareto-optimal but may 
be dangerous and fully annoying. For example, some people are rolling in luxury and others are near it and as 
long as the starved cannot be made better off, without cutting into the pleasures of the rich people, but still 
the economy can be optimal. 
 
5.5 Method of Majority Decision (MMD) 
 
When we go from individual orderings to social preferences we call it collective choice rule (CCR). The 
MMD is one such CCR. The MMD means the social welfare function in which xRy  iff 
   xyNyxN  , ,  , where  yxN  ,  be the number of individuals such that yxRi . MMD may be 
transitive; i.e., if xRy , yRz  then xRz . If zyx   then xRy xRx ,    xxNxxN  , ,  . In this 
case also MMD is transitive. But sometimes MMD is not transitive. For example, in ABC  voter paradox 
(Here A  for Arrow, B  for Black and C  for Condorcet; as they first drew attention to such paradox) 
suppose we have a community consisting of three individuals A , B  and C . Assume that they have three 
alternatives x , y , z  from which to choose. Let x , y  and z  stands respectively for hot war, cold war or 
peace with another group of individuals. If A  prefers x  to y , and y  to z  then we write 
AAA PzPyx  etc.  
Here we omit indifference between two alternatives; that is, for x  and y  we have yPxxPy or     . We 
assume that choices x , y  and z  are transitive; that is, xPy  and yPz    xPz .   
For voter paradox, suppose the preference relation for A , B  and C  are as follows; 
  AAA PzPyx        (1a) 
  BBB PxPzy        (1b) 
  CCC PyPxz .       (1c) 
 
Now we want to impose two conditions which are (i) the relation should be transitive and (ii) the relation 
should satisfy the majority rule. From (1) we see that x  is preferred to y  by A  and C , and the majority 
rule x  is preferred to y  by the group. Again, we see that y  is preferred to z  by A  and B , again by the 
majority rule y  is preferred to z  by the group. Since we claim that the group choice be transitive, so that x  
will be preferred to z  by the group. If we now require that the group choice be transitive, we deduce that x  
is preferred to z  by the group. However, from (1b-c) we see that in fact z  is preferred to x  by B  and C , 
hence the majority rule z  should be preferred to x . Thus we see that in the situation that the individual 
choice is given by (1a-c) it is not possible to impose the requirements of transitivity and majority rule 
simultaneously, although these conditions are fairly reasonable. 
 
The above problem expresses the fact that certain difficulties arise when we try to work out the preference of 
a group from those of the individuals in it, even when one wants his reasonable requirements to be satisfied. 
Arrow’s theorem (will be discussed below) deals with such impossibility of finding group preference.  
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5.6 Social Welfare Function (SWF) 
 
The definition of SWF by Arrow is as follows:  
 
A CCR that specifies orderings for the society is called a social welfare function F.  SWF is such a rule that 
each social collective choice rules such that each social preference that is determined is an ordering. Arrow’s 
SWF is such a particular type of CCR that each social preference satisfies an ordering (reflexive, transitive 
and complete). It must always work, no matter what finite set of alternatives and preference profiles; i.e., if 
xPy  at the start it always remains the same. In SWF there must be no dictator. Let  naaaY  ..., , , 21  
denote a finite set of alternatives or social choice options among which the voters must select one and let  YR  denote the set of strict linear rankings onY . Let  nN  ..., ,2 ,1  be a finite set of individual voters. 
A function YRf N :  will be called a social choice function. A member of NR  is called a profile of 
rankings and its ith  component is called individual i ’s ranking. 
 
A  SWF is a function RRf N :  which aggregates voters’ preferences into a single preference order 
onY . The N -tuple:  NRR  ..., ,1  of voters’ preferences is called a preference profile. 
 
The methods of transforming preference profiles into winners; i.e., mappings from the set of possible 
preference profiles into the set of alternatives is called voting procedures. For each preference profile the 
mapping procedures have a single winning alternative. Such a mapping is called a social decision function 
(SDF). The SWF first studied by Arrow, are the rules for transforming preference profile into social 
preference orderings or rankings. Arrow indicates that there exists no satisfactory SWF (will be discussed 
below). A satisfactory SDF should not be a dictatorship (Feldman 1979). Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite 
(1973, 1975) independently proved this as follows: “If a satisfactory social decision function is one which is 
always immune to manipulation and which is non-dictatorial, there is no satisfactory social decision 
function”. 
 
5.7 Social Choice Function and Monotonic Function 
 
Let  nN  ..., ,2 ,1  be the set of individual voters, and let  ... , , , zyxY   be the complete and 
transitive finite set of alternatives. Let  YL  denote the set of strict transitive ordering of the alternatives in 
Y  and  NYL  denote the set of profiles of such preference orderings, one for each individual voter. A 
function   YYLf N :  will be called a social choice function. A social choice function f  is monotonic 
if whenever   xLLf N  ..., ,1  for any alternative x  and for every individual i , and every alternative y  
the ranking iL  ranks x  above y  if iL  does, then   xLLf N   ..., ,1 . 
            
5.8 Prerequisites of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 
 
For simplicity let us consider there are two individuals in the society and three social alternatives x , y , z . 
For the preference orderings for individual 1 or 2 there are exactly 3666   different constellations of 
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individual preferences possible in the society (figure-7) where alternatives are ordered from top to bottom 
(Feldman 1974). 
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Figure-7: The preference orderings for individual 1 or 2 there are exactly 36 different constellations of 
individual preferences possible in the society. 
 
Before going to discuss Arrow’s impossibility theorem we have to study the following requirements. 
 
i) Completeness and transitivity: We have defined these conditions in section-3 as: for any pair of 
alternatives x  and y  then either xRy  or yRx  must hold, and for any triple x , y , z  we have for xRy  
and yRz  must imply xRz . The social preference relations generated by a CCR must be complete and 
transitive. The requirement says that a CCR must always permit social choices between alternatives, and that 
social choices must be consistent, or not inherently self-contradictory. Several well known collective choice 
rules do not generate complete and transitive social preference relations. For example, unanimous voting 
produces incomplete social rankings: if individual 1 prefers x  to y  and 2 prefers y  to x  neither 
alternative wins a unanimous vote over the other. Majority voting produces non-transitive social rankings 
(See definition MMD). 
 
ii) Universality or Unrestricted Domain (U): In social choice theory U is a property of SWF’s in which 
preferences of all the voters are factored into the final ordering of societal choices. Hence U is a common 
requirement for all social choice functions. U indicates that the SWF accounts for all preferences among all 
voters to yield a unique and complete ranking of social choices. The SWF must be wide enough in scope to 
work from any logical set of individual orderings. The Pareto principal gives a perfectly fine social orderings 
if the preferences of individuals are unanimous. But in the case of incomplete preference relations it will not 
have a social orderings thus it fails to satisfy the requirement of Arrow. Similarly, the MMD may yield 
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intransitives in some cases so the MMD also fails for U. According to this restriction in figure-7, the rule 
should give us a social preference ordering for every cell not just for the easy ones, like those where there is 
unanimous agreement; i.e., the diagonal cells in figure-7. 
 
iii) Pareto consistency (efficiency) or unanimity (P): The SWF must satisfy the Pareto principle in the 
weak form; i.e., if everyone prefers x  to y , then the society must also prefers x  to y .  Mathematically, for 
any , , Xyx   
  xPyyxPi i  :   
i.e., if alternative x  is ranked above y  for all orderings  NRR  ..., ,1  then x  is ranked higher than y  by  NRRF  ..., ,1 . Pareto consistency is a very mild requirement for a CCR. If the societies are ruled by 
external forces then one can not expect it to hold in societies. For example, (Feldman 1974) everyone prefers 
lust and gambling, on the one hand, to chastity and frugality on the other, but where, according to a Holy 
Book, the society state of chastity and frugality is preferable to the society state of lust and gambling. But the 
external forces, considering their economy, naturally would recommend lust and gambling. 
 
iv) Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): IIA means that the social ranking of x  vis-à-vis y  must 
depend only on individual rankings of x  vs. z  or y  vs. w  or z  vs. w  or any other such irrelevancy. Let 
Y  be a set of alternatives, R  be the set of social ordering and  RYC  ,  be the choice function, then for a 
single individual the choice made from any fixed environment Y  should be independent of the very 
existence of alternatives outside of Y . Again consider, if R  and R  be the relations determined by f  
corresponding respectively to two sets of individual preferences,  nRR  ..., ,1  and  nRR   ..., ,1 . 
If iyRxyxRYyx ii     , ,  , then  RYC  ,  and  RYC  ,  are the same. Condition IIA is the most 
subtle of all the requirements. Suppose society chooses democracy ( d ) over communism ( c ) and fascism 
( f ) is their third alternative. At one stage everyone of the society suddenly changes the desirability of f  
but no one changes his mind about d  vs. c . The independence requirement says that, if society is faced 
with the choice between d  and c , and only those two, it must still choose d  over c . 
 
The standard example of a CCR that violates independence is the rule of weighted voting. Let the society be 
made up of two individuals 1 and 2. Suppose 1’s initial preferences are cdPfP 11 , while 2’s initial 
preferences are cdPfP 22 . Suppose a person’s first choice gets a weight of 10 points, a second choice gets 7 
points, and a third choice get 3 points. If the social choice is between c  and d , d  gets 1477  , and c  
gets 13310   points; so d  is socially preferred to c . Now let 1 become totally disillusioned with f ; his 
ordering changes to fcPdP 11 . Now if d  vs. c  votes are repeated, d  gets, 17710   points, and c  
gets, 17710   points. Society has become indifferent between d  and c ; even though neither 1 nor 2 
changed his mind about these two alternatives. 
 
v). Non-Dictatorship (D):  It is required that the SWF should not be dictatorial. That is, there should be no 
such individual that whenever prefers x  to y , society must prefer x  to y , irrespective of the preferences 
else. This is called the condition of non-dictatorship. Mathematically, there is no such individual i  that for 
every element in the domain of rule f , Xyx   ,  such that xPyyxPi  . Anonymous voting systems 
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with at least two voters satisfy the non-dictatorship property. The dictatorship is undesirable in the society. 
First, it is undesirable because one’s worst enemy might be dictator. Second, it is not a CCR. So that 
dictatorship may cause the violation of human rights. 
 
The Pareto consistency requirement says a CCR must respect unanimous opinion: if both 1 and 2 prefer one 
alternative to another, then society must also prefer the one to the other. For example, given the configuration 
of individual preferences of the 1st row, 3rd column cell of figure-7, the Pareto requirement says x  and y  
must be socially preferred to z . Application of Pareto consistency over the entirety of figure-7 gives rise to 
figure-8. Each cell of this figure is produced by applying Pareto consistency to the corresponding cell of 
figure-7 so that any rule for generating social preferences must be entirely consistent with figure-8 (Feldman 
1974). 
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Figure-8: Preference Relations Depending On Pareto Consistency. 
 
Now consider the independence requirement. Suppose that, when applied to the constellation of preferences, 
 
                                                     1                                         2 
                                1st                x                                        y  
                                2nd               y                                       x  
                                3rd               z                                        z  
 
a collective choice rule gives x  is socially preferred to y . Then yxP1  providing that yxP1  and xyP2 , no 
matter how 1 and 2 changes their feelings about the irrelevant alternative z . 
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Similarly, we must have yPx  or xIy  whenever yxP1  and xyP2 . 
 
Now independence requires that all the cells in figure-7 where yxP1  and xyP2  must yield identical social 
rankings of x  and y . Similarly, all the cells where xyP1  and yxP2  must yield identical social rankings of 
x  and y . There is no presumption, however, that social x - y  ranking on the xyP1  and yxP2  cells. Such 
neutrality condition is unnecessary for the proof of the theorem, although it is intuitively appealing and 
useful in other contents (Feldman 1974). We are now in a position to discuss Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem: 
 
6. ARROW’S THEOREM 
 
Suppose that the set of alternatives Y  has at least three elements and the conditions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are 
satisfied. Then there exists an individual Uuk  , such that     
   kn wwwwW  ..., , , 21 , some k , nk 1 ; 
that is, the group preference coincides with that of some one (single) individual. 
 
Brief Discussion: Here the discussion is simple and direct so that who are new in this field can easily capture 
the concept of the theorem. We will give very simple version of the theorem in five steps following Reny 
(2000) and Geanokoplos (2005). Here individuals’ choices are inputs and social order is their output. 
 
Step 1: Let us consider any two distinct alternatives Yyx  ,  and a profile of rankings in which x  is 
ranked at the highest position and y  is at the lowest position for every individual Ni . 
By Pareto efficiency x  is strictly at the top of the social order (profile-1). 
 
   1R  … 1nR    nR     1nR  …  NR                 Social order  
   x   …  x         x       x      …    x                             x  
    .           .           .         .                .                               . 
    .           .           .         .                .                          .  
    .           .           .         .                .                               .               
   y    … y        y      y      …   y                             y . 
      
     Profile-1 
 
Now change all the individual i ’s rankings by keeping y  above x  for ni  , and keeping x   at the very 
top and keeping y  at the 2nd row for ni   and keeping unchanged for ni   in profile-1 to obtain profile-
2. Here the individual n  is extremely pivotal; i.e., the individual n  be such that whatever alternative be at 
the very top of the ranking, the social choice will be that alternative. The IIA implies that in this case social 
order will be such that x  will be at the very top of the ranking.  
 
   1R  … 1nR  nR   1nR  …  NR                   Social order  
   y   … y     x     x      …    x                          x                                   
   x  …  x      y      .              .                             .          
    .          .        .      .               .                       .                                                                              
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    .          .        .      .               .                          y  
    .          .        .      .               .                            . 
    .          .        .     y     …   y                           . 
  
     Profile-2 
 
Now change all the individual i ’s rankings by keeping y  above x  for ni   and keeping unchanged for 
ni   in profile-1 to obtain profile-3. The IIA implies that in this case social order will be such that y  will 
be at the very top of the ranking.  
 
 
 
 
   1R  … 1nR nR     1nR  … NR                   Social order 
   y   … y      y      x     …  x                             y  
   x   … x       x        .             .                             x             
    .          .        .          .             .                          . 
    .          .        .          .             .                               . 
    .          .        .        y     …  y                              . 
 
     Profile-3 
 
Step 2: Now we derive profile-2a from profile-2 by moving alternative x  to the bottom of individual i ’s 
rankings and keeping y  above x  for ni   and moving x  to the second last row in i ’s ranking for ni   
but not changing the ranking of individual n . By IIA the social ranking remain unchanged in this new 
profile.  
 
   1R  … 1nR   nR   1nR   … NR                     Social order 
   y  … y       x        .            .                               x  
    .         .        y        .            .                          y  
    .         .          .         .            .                                .  
    .         .          .        x     … x                               .         
   x  …  x        .        y    …  y                              . 
 
     Profile-2a 
 
Now we derive profile-3a from profile-3 by moving alternative x  to the bottom of individual i ’s rankings 
and keeping y  above x  for ni   and moving x  to the second last row in i ’s ranking for ni   but not 
changing the ranking of nR . By IIA the social ranking remain unchanged in this new profile.  
   1R  … 1nR nR     1nR  …  NR                Social order 
   y  … y      y        .             .                          y  
    .         .        x        .             .                      x  
    .         .         .       x    …    x                            .  
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   x  …  x       .       y   …     y                            . 
 
     Profile-3a 
 
Here we observed that profiles-2a and -3a differ only in individual n ’s ranking of alternatives x  and y . 
Since social order at the very top is y  in profile-3a, hence by the IIA social order at the very top will be 
either x  or y . However, y  is at the very top in profile-2a, then by IIA the social order at the very top must 
be y , a contradiction. Hence the social order at the very top in profile-2a is x . 
 
Step 3: Let Az  be a distinct element from x  and y . Now we form a new profile-4 from profile-2a where 
z is new alternative such that x  is at the top, z is in 2nd row and y  is in 3rd row in the n ’s ranking. Also z is 
in 3rd last row, y  is in 2nd last row, x  is in last row for ni    and also z  is in 3rd last row, x  is in 2nd last 
row, y  is in last row for ni  . By IIA social order at the very top in profile-4 is x . 
 
   1R  … 1nR  nR     1nR  … NR                           Social order 
    .           .       x         .             .                                     x  
    .           .       z         .             .                                       . 
    .          .       y         .             .                                  .  
   z   … z       .         z     …   z                                      . 
   y   … y       .        x     …   x                                       . 
   x  …  x       .        y    …   y                                       . 
 
     Profile-4 
 
Step 4: Now interchange the ranking of alternatives x  and y  in profile-4 for ni   and keep the 
alternatives unchanged for individuals ni   to obtain profile-5. Social ranking at the very top will be x  in 
profile-4, hence by the IIA the social order at the very top be either x  or y  in profile-5. However, in social 
order y  cannot be at the top in profile-5, since alternative z  is ranked above y  in every individual’s 
ranking, and Pareto efficiency would then imply that the social order y  would remain above z . Hence, x  is 
socially top-ranked and z  is socially ranked above y  in profile-5. 
 
   1R  … 1nR  nR      1nR  … NR                         Social order  
    .         .        x           .           .                                    x   
    .         .        z           .           .                                      .  
    .         .        y          .           .                                      .  
    .         .         .           .            .                                z  
    .         .         .           .            .                                      .                                                                   
   z  …  z       .          z     … z                                    y  
   y …  y       .          y    … y                                     .   
   x  …  x       .          x     … x                                     . 
                                                     
     Profile-5 
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Step 5: We observed that an arbitrary profile of rankings with x  at the top of individual n ’s ranking can be 
obtained have the profile-5 without reducing the ranking of x  versus any other alternative in any 
individual’s ranking. Hence, IIA implies that the social choice must be x  whenever x  is at the top of 
individual’s ranking. So, we may say that individual n  is a dictator for alternative x . Since x  is arbitrary; 
we have shown that for each alternative Yx  , there is a dictator for x . But clearly there cannot be distinct 
dictators for distinct alternatives. Hence there is a single dictator for all the alternatives. 
 
7. GIBBARD’S THEOREM 
 
Allan Gibbard proved his theorem in his original seminal paper, Gibbard (1977), with several lemmas. We 
discuss his theorem here in easier way as per as possible following Mclennan (2008).  
 
7.1 Discussion 
 
 Let  ... , , , zyxY   be the complete, transitive and asymmetric ordering finite set of social alternatives 
and let  nN  ..., ,3 ,2 ,1  be the set of individuals or voters. The utility function is defined by  
.: RYU   For all Yyx  , ,    yUxU   if and only if xPy . For any finite set A ,  A   denotes the 
space of probability measures on A . Each voter wants to maximize an expected utility function,  
     xpxUEU
Yx


 ,   whenever  Yp   and p  is the probability of 
winning. 
Let a preference profile is defined by  nPPP  ..., , , 21P . Let  NYP  the set of profiles. For each 
ni  ..., ,2 ,1  let  Ni YP  be the set of  1n -tuples of preferences  nii PPPP  ..., , , ..., , 111  , thought of 
as configurations of preferences of the voters other than i . So that if  NYPP  is given  YiP  will 
denote the  1n -tuples obtained by dropping iP . Let    Nii YPY  P  then iP  are given by  
     niiiii PPPPPP  ..., , , , ..., , , 111  P   
and is the profile obtained by combining these objects. If  NYPP  and iP  are given by,  
   ii PiPi    ,/ PP   
and is  the profile obtained from P  by replacing iP  with iP . Now we defined the decision scheme as 
     YYPd N : . 
We denote the probability assigned to alternative x  by the decision scheme at profile P  by  P ,xd . Let 
 mddd  ..., ,1  and if there are positive scalars m  ..., ,1  such that 1...1  m  then 
       PPP  ,... , , 11 xdxdxd mm   for all alternatives x  and profiles P . The 
decision scheme d  is potentially manipulable by i  at a profile P  if      PP dUiPidU / . If d  is 
not manipulable then it is said to be strategy-proof. A lottery   is Pareto optimal ex post for profile C if 
  0x  for alternative x . The decision scheme d  is Pareto optimific ex post if, for every profile P , 
 Pd  is Pareto optimal ex post for P . 
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For a preference P ,  Pf  be the top ranked alternative. A decision scheme d  is dictatorial if there exists a 
vector i  such that    1, PiPfd  for all  NYPP . A random dictatorship is a probability mixture of 
dictatorship. Now we can introduce the Gibbard’s theorem as follows: 
 
7.2 Theorem (Gibbard 1977) 
 
 If there are three or more alternatives and the decision scheme d  is strategy-proof and Pareto optimific ex 
post, then it is a random dictatorship. 
 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper analyses Political Economics and Social Welfare in some details. In this paper it has been 
indicated how a political institution is formed, and how this serves the society by creating efficient and 
democratic leaders. The Nash equilibrium has been clarified by game theory, which describes and explains 
an essential part of the society. Game theory plays an important role also to explain more clearly the 
problems of Economics and Political Science. In this paper unitary and federal democracy has been discussed 
briefly to show their importance in the society. It is hoped that easier discussion of Arrow’s theorem and 
Gibbard’s theorem will give a better idea to the readers about dictatorship. Interested readers are requested to 
see Islam, Mohajan and Moolio (2009) to know about combinatorial approach and geometrical approach to 
Arrow’s theorem. The paper is a review of other’s works, but throughout the paper social matters have been 
discussed with simple mathematical calculations and introducing definitions wherever it was necessary.  
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